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This thesis conducts a cost comparison between contractor and
organic support for the CH-53 Aircraft in two major operating cost
areas, training and aircraft overhaul. A life cycle cost approach is
used and cost differentials are found for the twenty year life expectancy
of the CH-53 system. The intent of the study was not to criticize or
change the existing system, but rather to provide cost data and plan-
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This thesis was orginally planned to be a complete life cycle cost
study of a major, representative aircraft system. The CH-53 was
chosen as the subject of the study simply because of its familiarity to
the author. The entire system was reviewed in an effort to uncover
areas where reduction in life cycle cost was possible. The intent of
the study was not to change the existing CH-53 A/D program, but to
uncover areas of possible cost savings that could be considered while
planning future aircraft systems. The study is not declared to be
exact but rather an approximation of costs that existed at the time of
data gathering.
All major cost categories were initially reviewed and the original
concept of the study was reduced to two major cost areas, maintenance
training and aircraft overhaul. The reasons for this reduction were
that the initial range was too broad and voluminous, that viable alter-
natives of contractor versus organic support were available for the
areas selected, and that detailed cost information existed enabling a
comprehensive cost analysis. The alternative used in both areas,
maintenance training and aircraft overhaul, is contractor furnished
support, that is, the aircraft manufacturer, Sikorsky Aircraft.

B. PRESENT POLICY
The Bureau of the Budget Circular A-76 (Revised) Transmittal
Memorandum No. 2 of October 18, 1976 reflects the present policies
of the Federal Government concerning commercial or industrial products
1
and services for Government use. It reads:
Background . OMB Circular A-76 expresses the
Government's general policy of relying upon the
private enterprise system to supply its needs for
products and services, in preference to engaging
in commercial or industrial activity. This policy
reflects the fundamental concept that the government
should generally perform only those functions which
are governmental in nature and should utilize the
competitive incentives of the private enterprise sys-
tem to provide the products and services which are
necessary to support governmental functions. Those
commercial or industrial activities which the Govern-
ment performs directly for itself are not inherently
governmental functions, but rather are exceptions to
the fundamental concept and their performance by
Government personnel must be justified as being in
the National interest.
Supplemental Guidance
. OMB Circular A-76 sets
forth specific circumstances under which it may be
in the National interest for the Government to pro-
vide directly some products and services for its
own use. One of these circumstances permits justi-
fication of Government commercial or industrial
activity if a detailed comparative cost analysis
demonstrates that Government performance would
result in sufficient savings to justify involvement
in such activity. However, the Circular does not
require that a cost study be made in every case to
support a decision in compliance with the policy
preference for reliance on commercial sources.
Since the Bureau of the Budget has been superseded by the Office
of Management and Budget, this publication will be referred to as OMB
Circular A-76 throughout the remainder of this paper.

A cost analysis is not needed in circumstances where
the Government's economic interests would be pro-
tected, such as the existence of a competitive com-
mercial market, unless the agency has some unique
economic advantage which would enable it to supply
the needed product or service at less than commercial
cost. In determining whether a cost study should be
undertaken, consideration should be given to the delay
and expense involved in a study sufficiently detailed
and comprehensive to provide valid results.
The circular goes on to list the conditions under which a Govern-
ment commercial or industrial activity may be authorized. [Ref. 1,
page 2].
a. Procurement of a product or service from a
commercial source would disrupt or materially
delay an agency's program .
b. It is necessary for the Government to conduct
a commercial or industrial activity for purpose of
combat support or for individual and unit retraining
of military personnel or to maintain or strengthen
mobilization readiness
.
c. A satisfactory commercial source is not avail -
able and cannot be developed in time to provide a
product or service when it is needed .
d. The product or service is available from an -
other Federal Agency .
e. Procurement of the product or service from a
commercial source will result in higher cost to the
Government .
In consideration of present Government policy, it would be justi-
fied to note at this point that the entire CH-53 program had been plan-
ned and implemented prior to the issuance of the original Bureau of the
Budget Circular A-76 on March 3, 1966. It should also be re-emphasized
that this study is not designed to criticize the existing CH-53 program

but rather to promote cost saving initiatives in future aircraft systems.
The policies set forth in OMB circular A-76 provide new alternatives.
The circular defines new starts as follows:
A "new start" is a newly established Government com-
mercial or industrial activity involving annual costs of
production of $50, 000 or more. A reactivation, expan-
sion, modernization or replacement of an activity in-
volving additional capital investment of $50, 000 or more
or additional annual costs of production of $100, 000 or
more, for purposes of this Circular, are also regarded
as "new starts. " Consolidating of two or more activities
without increasing the overall total amount of products
or services provided is not a "new start. "
The circular dictates that no executive agency will initiate a "new
start" or continue the operation of an existing "Government commercial
or industrial activity" except as specifically required by law or as pro-
vided in the Circular. It should be noted here that in this study, with its
life cycle cost approach and therefore its application only to planning the
entire life cycle of future aircraft systems, the continuance of the exist-
ing industrial facilities in the present CH-53 system are justified due to
the handling of the value of the land and facilities as available for other
uses. In a cost analysis of the CH-53 system, as it exists today, these
values would be classified as sunk cost and therefore would not be rel-
evant considerations.
Both areas considered in this study exceed the amounts stated above
and do not qualify under the five conditions under which a Government
commercial or industrial activity may be authorized. To clarify
the second condition, combat support, it is felt that with present day
10

aircraft (C-5 type) it is no longer necessary for overhaul support to
be near the battlefield as it was not in Vietnam.
Therefore, the purposes of this study, the two areas of considera
tion, training and aircraft overhaul, are considered to be areas in
which the program manager has the option of planning for contractor
support if this alternative proves to be more economically feasible





Basically the major areas of cost in designing any aircraft system
are the cost of the initial aircraft procurement, the cost of spare parts,
and the cost of the manpower required to maintain the system. Procure-
ment should be realized as the most complex and the least variable cost
per aircraft unit. The procurement system involves negotiated contracts,
both fixed price and cost reimbursement types, between the contractor
and the involved defense agency and receives the attention of many mem-
bers of the Departments of Defense and Navy. The overall management
of weapon acquisition is the responsibility of three assistant secretaries
of the Navy. [Ref. 2, page 71]. The Assistant Secretary for Financial
Management (Comptroller) directs cost estimating, budgeting, and cost
control activities. The Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve
Affairs and Logistics determines procurement policy and quantities of
each weapon to be purchased. He also directs contract administration
and program management. And the Assistant Secretary for Research and
Development directs ongoing research and development programs and
the initiation of new programs. Of the three, the Assistant Secretary for
Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics has primary responsibility for
policies governing contract negotiation and administration throughout the
duration of development and production programs.
12

Assisting in the acquisition of the CH-53 system was the program
manager and his staff. [Ref. 2, page 1 6 9] . The program manager is
responsible for research, development, evaluation, procurement,
deployment and effective overall management of the program.
With all this expertise and high level attention from within the
Department of the Navy focused on the acquisition process, it should
be assumed that the contract cost was fair to both the contractor and
the Navy and was not a variable in any cost study. Therefore, the
only major variable in the acquisition process was the number of air-
craft purchased.
The number of aircraft to be purchased is arrived at by multiply-
ing the number of aircraft planned for each squadron by the number of
planned squadrons and adding an attrition factor. The planned number
of aircraft per squadron is dependent upon squadron mission and is
arrived at by projecting total flight hours necessary to complete that
mission by the Chief of Naval Operations utilization factor of flight
hours for each individual aircraft each month. In the case of the CH-53,
that CNO utilization factor was, at the time of aircraft introduction to
the fleet, 3 5 hours per month per aircraft and this was the number
used when planning for spare parts distribution and manning levels for
organizational and intermediate levels of maintenance.
Reduction in the number of aircraft acquisitioned, while maintain-






A more efficient design of the system could also produce
significant savings in operations and maintenance funds in the future.
This idea was not researched because it was assumed that the program
manager weighed the cost and benefits of further research and develop-
ment and conducted his program with the optimum investment in that
area.
2. Spares Support
Better planning for spare parts procurement and positioning
would reduce the hours of aircraft not operationally ready for flight
because of shortage of parts thus reducing the number of aircraft
necessary for mission support. This area was researched through
interviews with representatives of the manufacturer, Sikorsky Aircraft,
interviews with representatives of the Aviation Supply Office in
Philadelphia, and with representatives of NAVAIR. All involved
personnel agreed that parts shortage problems were not the fault of
inaccurate models for parts procurement and positioning, but rather
the fault of inexperienced and inadequately trained personnel handling
and maintaining those parts. All concerned agreed that with more
efficient personnel, the spare parts problem would probably have been
eliminated, thus training became a factor.
3. Quality and Quantity of Maintenance Personnel
At the time of introduction of the CH-53 to the fleet, the
United States Marine Corps used manpower planning factors contained
14

in OPNAVINST 5311. 3G to arrive at squadron manning levels and to
construct the Table of Organization for the CH-53 units.
Exact numbers of personnel will not be used in this report
in order to avoid classification since the manpower planning factors
are classified confidential. However, in order to increase aircraft
availability and hence increase the planned hours per aircraft per
month, thus reducing total aircraft procurement, a logical area to
start would be to decrease aircraft non-operationally ready because of
maintenance (decrease maintenance down time). This could be done by
increasing numbers of maintenance personnel and was the early argu-
ment of maintenance supervisors since squadron manning levels were
considerably below the manpower planning factors contained in OPNAV-
INST 5311. 3G. This approach would increase operational and main-
tenance cost and thus was not the objective of this research. A more
logical area to emphasize would be maintenance training and this
approach agrees with increasing the efficiency of spare parts handling.
B. TRAINING OPTIONS AVAILABLE
1 . Organic Support
The CH-53 was introduced into the operational forces of the
Marine Corps late in 1966. At that time all formal training was ac-
complished by the contractor with some "on the job" training being
accomplished at the organizational level as aircraft inventories were
being increased. However, all formal training, beyond the initial
15

training required to form the nucleus of CH-53 maintenance capability,
was programmed to be accomplished at Naval Air Maintenance Training
Detachments located at Marine Corps Air Station, New River, on the
East Coast, and Marine Corps Air Station, Santa Ana, on the West
Coast. In order to support this proposed training, two buildings were
erected, one on either coast and the U.S. Navy made substantial
investments in other training devices. The total costs of these invest-
2
ments are listed in exhibit #1.
EXHIBIT # 1
COST OF PRESENT U.S. NAVY TRAINING PROGRAM
Initial cadre training by Sikorsky Aircraft
including preparation of all software and
training material.
U.S. Navy instructor training material
preparation and training courses.
Maintenance Trainer design and fabrication
for the CH-53A NAMTRADET on the West Coast.
CH-53D Maintenance Trainers for the East Coast.
Construction of West Coast NAMRADET building.











All training aids were contractor supplied and the costs listed
on exhibit #1 were supplied by Sikorsky Aircraft.
3
The cost of the West Coast NAMTRADET building was given by
the Public Works Center at MCAS El Toro. The cost of the East Coast
building has proven elusive, therefore, for the purpose of this report
the same figure as the West Coast is used.
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All costs listed in exhibit #1 are expressed in terms of 1966
dollars and their total represents the capital investment made by the
U.S. Navy into formal training for the CH-53 program. Using a 10%
rate of discount which is the current rate directed by Department of
Defense Instruction 7041.3, the opportunities foregone in the private
sector are valued at $1, 191, 894 (10% multiplied by the total costs of
$11, 918, 936). This amount represents the annual cost to the private
sector of the capital investment required to support organic training
in the CH-53 program.
In addition to the annual cost of supporting the initial invest-
ment required for organic training, operation and maintenance cost
also must be considered. Only cost data for the fiscal year 1976 was
available during research and this data is quoted in exhibit #2 below.
[Ref. 6], The data includes costs allocated for headquarters support
of the Naval Air Training Center at NAS Memphis. This approach is
considered proper because in planning future systems some marginal
cost for increased headquarters support would be involved if organic
rather than contractor support was chosen for training of maintenance
personnel.
For the purposes of this analysis, the student salaries of
$422, 166 will be omitted since this cost must be absorbed under either
organic or contractor training.
In exhibit #2, the contractor category includes outside contracts
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Also excluded from this analysis is the $1,091, 108 allocated to student
hospitalization/depreciation. This cost is not considered differential
cost for the purpose of comparison.
Therefore, a net annual cost of operating and maintaining the
CH-53 Naval Air Training Detachment for the fiscal year 1976 was
$470,473. Combining this figure with the $1, 191, 894 opportunity cost
derived above, the total annual cost of conducting organic training for
the CH-53 program for the fiscal year 1976 was $1, 662, 367.
2. Contractor Support
Sikorsky Aircraft has been interested in receiving a contract
to provide all training for the CH-53 program since the early days of
the program. Their current cost proposals are listed in exhibit #3.
[Ref. 4].
EXHIBIT #3
SIKORSKY COST PROPOSALS FOR CONTRACTORS
FURNISHED MAINTENANCE TRAINING FOR THE CH-53 PROGRAM
Preparation of software (not to military
specification) Fleet Training $ 60,000.
Instructor training materials 35,000.
Training devices 1,000,000.
Expansion of Sikorsky Facilities 175,000.
TOTAL $1,270,000.
As can be determined from exhibit #3, an initial capital
investment of $1, 270, 000 was all that was required by Sikorsky Aircraft
19

in their proposals to supply contractor training. In order to insure
consistency, a 10% discount rate will be used here also, resulting in an
annual cost to the public sector of $127,000 per year.
In addition to this cost, Sikorsky Aircraft proposed a team of
8 instructors at an annual cost of $30, 000 per instructor per year for a
total instructor fee of $240,000. This would result in a total per annum
cost to the U.S. Navy of $367,000 to support maintenance training in
the CH-53.
In the Sikorsky proposals, fewer training devices would have
been required and would not have had to be to military specifications.
Use of bailed aircraft would have been incorporated into
courses to be used as training aids.
Also, the second set of training devices would not have been
required due to training being conducted at a single site.
C. COST COMPARISON BETWEEN ORGANIC AND CONTRACTOR
TRAINING
Using the two annual figures for providing maintenance training
for the CH-53 program, a cost comparison over the life cycle of the
program becomes possible. Exhibit #4 depicts this comparison and
shows that over the 20 years expected life of the CH-53 program,
organic training exceeds contractor training by $11,028,755 in terms





COMPUTATION OF LIFE CYCLE COST OF MAINTENANCE
TRAINING FOR THE CH-53 PROGRAM
INITIAL CAPITAL INVESTMENT
times 10% discount rate
sub total





annuity factor for 20 years
at 10%


















The lower life cycle cost for training by the contractor absorbs
the following
:
1. Maintenance and repair of training devices would be consider-
ably less because fewer would have been purchased.
2. Due to training aid and training devices not being produced
according to military specification and fewer training devices having
been built, a very substantial savings in updating costs would be
realized.
D. OTHER COST CONSIDERATIONS
Other cost factors exist which are very hard to quantify but never-
theless should be considered in any future decision concerning life cycle
cost of planned systems. A few pertinent areas, as they apply to the




An early argument against contractor training was personnel
travel expenses. The early plans, as discussed previously, provided
for a training site on each coast, thereby keeping travel to a minimum.
The cost of travel under the contractor support plan was thought to be
excessive since half of the CH-53 squadrons situated within the con-
tinental United States were West Coast squadrons. This was a legitimate
argument but was never quantified. In addition, the East Coast training
site never materialized. All NAMTRADET training for the CH-53 pro-
gram is performed on the West Coast at Marine Corps Air Station,
Santa Ana. As of the date of this writing all initial trainees leave
Memphis and are ordered temporarily to either MCAS New River or
MCAS Santa Ana. All trainees receive their formal instruction at
Santa Ana and then receive their permanent change of station orders
which could be to the opposite coast from where they were temporarily
ordered for training. This system is by no means the least economical
system when travel expenses are considered. Under contractor support,
all trainees could receive their permanent orders after Memphis and
travel on temporary orders to Sikorsky Aircraft for their formal
training. This would eliminate criss-crossing the country under the
present system and would also promote morale among the trainees.
2. Lodging
Another argument against contractor training was that there are
no government quarters available at Sikorsky Aircraft. This is a
22

legitimate argument when only the first five enlisted ranks are consid-
ered, but beyond that, there are no government quarters at Santa Ana
available for staff non-commissioned officers or officers. So, this
argument loses some of its meaning.
With the numbers of people involved in training for the CH-53
program, an appealing solution would be to provide some sort of
government quarters at the factory. No quantifiable evidence is avail-
able but a solution may be for the Navy Department to lease an entire
apartment complex to provide government housing as some local govern-
ments do to provide low-cost housing under the welfare program. An
in-depth study would be the subject of another paper.
3. Effectiveness
The above cost comparison between contractor and organic
training dealt with the efficiency of the existing program, that is,
reducing the input dollars assuming a constant output. However,
several considerations may alter this assumption.
a. Contractor furnished instructors would be career teach-
ing professionals while organic instructors are aircraft maintenance
personnel who have had some instruction training usually from the
contractor.
b. The continuity associated with contractor furnished
instructors would increase the output thereby increasing the effective-




c. Contractor furnished instructors are closer to the source,
that is, the aircraft manufacturer, and therefore have a valuable in-
formation source readily available.
d„ Any changes in systems would be introduced more rapidly
to the training factory personnel.
e. In the past, there have been a lack of quotas at the NAM-
TRADET. This concern would not exist under contractor training
support.
The idea of effectiveness relates back to the concept of a
decreased aircraft buy. If personnel are more effective, thereby
decreasing the number of aircraft and spare parts necessary to com-
plete the units' mission, then the reduction in life cycle cost would be
then reflected in the reduction of the number of aircraft and spare
parts acquisitioned. An accurate dollar amount would be hard to
identify but in the case of the CH-53, each unit acquisitioned averaged
more than $2,000,000, so considerable savings are possible in this
area.
E. A COMPARATIVE PROGRAM
Cost studies can be made with a comparative program. Sikorsky
Aircraft's Product Support Training was the sole source training for
helicopters for the U.S. Coast Guard from 1962 until recently.
Sikorsky still teaches all U. S. C. G helicopter maintenance courses
except one. The training presented by Sikorsky Aircraft helps to
24

enable the U.S. Coast Guard to support approximately 135 helicopters
at bases all over the world. The maximum cost of training to the
U.S. Coast Guard, in any calendar year, was $112,000. [Ref. 4].
25

III. DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE
A. BACKGROUND
At present the various Naval Air Rework Facilities (NARF's) are
responsible for the vast majority of all depot level maintenance per-
formed on United States Naval aircraft. This responsibility is assigned
by OPNAVINST 4790.20, dated 20 September 1976, which reads:
Depot Maintenance. That rework maintenance performed
on material requiring major overhaul or a complete re-
building of parts, assemblies, subassemblies and end
testing, and reclamation as required. Depot mainten-
ance serves to support lower categories of mainten-
ance by providing engineering assistance and perform-
ing that maintenance beyond the capability of the lower
level activities. It provides stocks of serviceable
equipment by using more extensive facilities for repair
than lower level maintenance activities. These functions
may be grouped as follows:
(1) Standard depot level maintenance of aircraft and
engines.
(2) Overhaul and repair of engines /components, and
aviation support equipment.
»
(3) Calibrations of equipage.
(4) Incorporation of designed technical directives.
(5) Modification of aircraft, engines, and related
equipment.
(6) Manufacture /modification of designated parts/
kits.




Naval Air Rework Facilities' responsibility for all depot level
maintenance is firmly entrenched in the Navy's system of operation
and dates back to the era when Naval Aviation needed depot level sup-
port at the battlefront. This battlefront support was only available
through an organic organization. With modern transport aircraft and
other means of transportation, it is questionable if this rationale is
still valid. For example, no depot level maintenance was performed
in Vietnam during that confrontation. Other alternatives should be
pursued in an effort to ascertain if a more reasonable, economic
alternative is available. This chapter compares proposed contractor
overhaul support with organic support in the CH-53 aircraft system.
Although all the functions of a Naval Air Rework Facility, which
are listed above, could be included in a comprehensive cost analysis,
only those functions concerned with contractor furnished equipment
are considered pertinent to this comparison. In the case of the CH-53,
the contractor is Sikorsky Aircraft, a division of United Technologies.
B. EXISTING RATES
At the time of this writing, almost all depot level maintenance on
the CH-53 aircraft was being performed at the Naval Air Rework
Facility at NAS North Island. By this statement, it is meant that all
complete aircraft overhauls were being performed by NARF, North
Island. Some minor component rework was being performed at NARF,
Pensacola as a preliminary to moving the entire overhaul of the CH-53
27

and its components to Pensacola. This move made this comparison
possible. In order to allow for the interim period between organic
sites, Sikorsky Aircraft has been solicited by the Navy to perform the
overhaul during that period, therefore, the cost of contractor support
is available. The fiscal year 1977 funded rates for NARF, North Island
were obtained from the comptroller division of NARF and are depicted
in exhibit # 5.
EXHIBIT #5
FISCAL YEAR 1977 FUNDED RATES
FOR
NAVAL AIR REWORK FACILITY, NORTH ISLAND
DIRECT LABOR . $9. 76 per direct labor hour
PRODUCTION OVERHEAD
Labor 3.91
Material 1.16 $5. 07 per direct labor hour
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE OVERHEAD
Labor 3.30
Material . 56
Contract /Other . 36
Station/Support 3. 11 $7. 33 per direct labor hour
TOTAL LABOR AND OVERHEAD $22. 16 per direct labor hour
DIRECT MATERIAL $28,960.00 per individual aircraft
Direct Labor is computed as the average labor rate. The Produc-
tion overhead costs include indirect labor, both support and supervisory
personnel, and material cost. The later includes "pre-expended" bin
items, i.e.
,
small, standard and inexpensive nut and bolt type items.
28

The production overhead labor rate also includes lost time and stand-
up meetings which are organization meetings to discuss progress, past
performance, future expectations, etc.
General and Administrative Overhead includes general supervisory
labor, all administrative personnel, general and administrative material,
contract support, station support which includes the station supply func-
tion, personnel support, the Industrial Relations Office, Data Process-
ing, public works (facility maintenance) and utilities. [Ref. 8]
As can be read from exhibit #5, total labor and overhead amounted
to $22. 16 per direct labor hour for NARF, North Island and this was
the rate which the customer was billed for each direct labor hour applied
during fiscal year 1977. Actual hours which were spent on each individ-
ual overhaul were billed, not a standard amount of hours per aircraft
overhaul.
The rates quoted by Sikorsky Aircraft (see exhibit #6) are those
proposed by Sikorsky for the one year period that they will be perform-
ing the depot level maintenance on the CH-53 while NARF, Pensacola
is in the process of preparing their shops and tools to accommodate the
overhauling of the aircraft and its major components. [Ref. 9]
Manufacturing Overhead for Sikorsky Aircraft includes heat,
power, lights, taxes, all facilities, machinery, equipment costs,
indirect labor and fringe benefits.
29

General and Administrative rates include support of operations,
personnel, product support, management, accounting, and fringe
benefits for this labor pool.
In addition to these costs, Sikorsky adds another 15% of the total
for profit.
Thus, Sikorsky's cost per direct labor hour computes out to
1. 15(1. 21(3. 38X6. 38)))=$30. 00.
The Direct Material Cost of $28, 960. 00 listed on exhibit #5 is
considered a norm or average and should be approximately the same,
indifferent as to whom (contractor versus organic) performs the work,
and therefore, it will not be considered any further in this analysis.
EXHIBIT #6








6. 38 per direct labor hour
23 8% of DLH
21% of (DLH and MO)
15% of above Total
C. A COMPARISON OF CONTRACTOR VERSUS ORGANIC RATES
FOR AIRCRAFT OVERHAUL
At first glance it seems apparent that the NARF is unquestionably
the more cost effective way to perform depot level maintenance on the
CH-53 ($22. 16 per direct labor hour versus $30. 00). However, several
30

factors are worthy of further consideration: (1) the cost of land and
facilities is not included in the totals for NARF, nor is there any allow-
ance for cost of capital invested in land and facilities, (2) Naval Air
Rework Facilities are immune to most taxes, federal, state, county,
city and property taxes, (3) the Navy Industrial Fund allowance for
NARF is not charged as cost of capital and (4) any existing real or non-
pecuniary benefits that may exist for either organization.
1 . Cost of Land and Facilities
Completely accurate data on the cost or present value of land
and facilities is not available for this paper. Such data would necessitate
a complete appraisal by a competent real estate appraiser and the cost
of such is beyond the realm and purpose of this paper. However, two
sources of data were uncovered by the research in preparation for this
writing. The first is a pamphlet published by the Naval Air Rework
Facility, North Island on 1 October 1968. [Ref. 10]. The second is
NARF's Financial and Cost Statements for the quarter ending June 30,
1977. [Ref. ll]. Some conflict exists which will try to be resolved an
the conclusion of this heading.
a. NARF pamphlet dated 1 October 1968. [Ref. 10].
The present value of land and facilities at NARF, North
Island was estimated at $42, 800,000 as of the publishing of this pamphlet.
Appreciating this figure at an annual rate of 10% (estimated 12% for land
and 8% for industrial facilities by a qualified California realtor and
appraiser) results in a current present value of $100,920,016. This
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figure was arrived at by multiplying the 1968 value of $42, 800, 000 by a
future value factor of 2.3579 (9 years at 10%). These facilities are
utilized in the overhaul of many different types of aircraft and their
components. Therefore, in order to qualify what percentage of the
above mentioned land and facilities is devoted solely to the CH-53,
some estimate of the ratio of CH-53 related work to total work is
necessary.
One approach of arriving at this percentage is to take the
weighted average of work performed in fiscal year 1977. NARF, North
Island performed a total of $93,000,000 worth of airframe related work
4
and $62, 000,000 worth of components related work. Of the airframe
work, 7% was CH-53 related and of the component 32% was CH-53
related. Therefore, of the total work performed ($155,000,000),
$26,350,000 was CH-53 related. This figure was obtained by adding
7% of $93, 000, 000 (6, 510, 000) to 32% of $62, 000, 000 ($19, 840, 000).
This total amount of CH-53 peculiar work represents 17% of the total
work performed at NARF, North Island during fiscal year 1977 and it
represents a reasonable average to use in this analysis.
However, because of the other minor work that is performed
at NARF, North Island (calibration of equipage, incorporation of designed
4
This information was obtained by the telephone conversation with
the Comptroller Division, NARF, North Island.
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technical directives, etc. ) their comptroller division estimates a more
conservative percentage for analyzing the CH-53's share of their total
work load. Using this more conservative figure of 16 2/3% of NARF's
facilities employed in the overhaul of CH-53 and related work, the
capital investment required to support this work is approximately
$16, 820, 002 (16 2/3% times $100, 920, 016). It is assumed that these
resources could easily be freed for alternative uses, such as private
industry. This assumption is also necessary to support the life cycle
cost concept of this paper, since by reviewing the CH-53 program,
decisions involving future systems may be made with more accuracy.
One of these future decisions may well be to establish another NARF
or to utilize contractor support for a future aircraft system.
The average number of CH-53 type aircraft overhauled
annually by NARF, North Island, has been forty-two. The current
5
average for direct labor hours per aircraft per overhaul is 4450 hours.
Therefore, the average annual direct labor hours dedicated to the over-
haul of the CH-53 is 144, 900 hours.
Utilizing the Department of Defense standard cost of
capital of 10%, the opportunity cost to the public sector is $1,682,000
annually to support facilities for CH-53 overhaul. This figure was





and rounding. Using the annual figure of 144, 900 direct labor hours,
the cost per direct labor hours for facilities is $11. 60 per hour
($1, 682, 000 / 144, 900). Using this costing method for land and facilities,
the $11. 60 per direct labor hour should be added to the $22. 16 per direct
labor hour figure for NARF, yielding a new figure of $33. 73 per direct
labor hour. This new figure exceeds Sikorsky's $30.00 per direct labor
hour and does not yet include the other factors mentioned above.
b. NARF's Financial and Cost Statements for the period
ending June 30, 1977. [Ref. ll].
The method used in this analysis parallels the above anal-
ysis, therefore, repetitious matter is omitted.
According to NARF's Financial and Cost Statement for
the period ending 30 June 1977, the amount of fixed capital invested
for all overhaul activities was $87,206,081. This figure was broken
down into $1, 207, 122 for land, $37, 904, 882 for buildings, and
$48, 121,422 for equipment. Depreciation allowance has not been
deducted from the above figures because under the life cycle cost
approach, the initial decision of organic versus contractor support
requires that the full investment amount be considered. Also, depre-
ciation is never a relevant cost in any cost effectiveness analysis.
Another reason is that depreciation is considered a statistical cost and




Again, using the conservative figure of 16 2/3% for the
CH-53's share of NARF's facilities, the capital investment required
under this approach to the analysis is $14, 534, 347 (16 2/3% of
$87, 206, 081). And as in the above analysis, it is assumed that these
resources could be freed for alternative uses.
Using the Department of Defense standard cost of capital
at 10%, under this method of analysis, the opportunity cost to the public
sector is $1, 453, 435 (10% of $14, 534, 347 rounded) annually to support
facilities for the CH-53 overhaul. Dividing this figure by the average
annual figure of 144, 900 direct labor hours yields a new cost per direct
labor hour for facilities of $10.03. When this figure is added to the
$22. 16 per direct labor hour quoted by NARF, a new figure of $32, 19 is
reached. This is lower than, although comparable to, $33. 76 which
was the result of the above analysis but is still unfavorable when com-
pared to Sikorsky's quoted rate of $30. 00 per direct labot hour.
Because of the a fortiori approach to analysis (worst casing
the new (contractor) alternative and best casing the status quo (NARF)
alternative), the lessor figure of $32. 19 will be used in any further
analysis. Any evidence favoring contractor support will only be strength-
ened if the larger number were used.
It should also be pointed out that in the first comparison
analysis, the cost of equipment was not considered in the organic
support. This again, would only strengthen the argument.
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2. Effect of Taxes on Contractor vs. Organic Support
In comparing two alternative ways of accomplishing the same
tasks, any cost peculiar to one should be considered in analyzing both
alternatives. In particular, taxes should be included in the analysis of
contractor versus organic support for aircraft overhaul.
In 1976, Sikorsky paid a total of approximately $16, 000, 000
6
in taxes. No data exist on the breakdown of these taxes because
Sikorsky is a division of United Technologies, and as such, does not
publish its own financial statement. However, it is evident that the
only duplication of taxes between the public and private sector is
contribution to employees' retirement funds which, in the case of the
private sector, is the employer's portion of social security taxes, and
in the case of the public sector is the government's liability brought
about by government employees' retirements. All other tax burdens
are preculiar to the private sector, and should be considered in any
analysis between sectors, since it is a cost of operation to the private
sector, but not the public. When the federal government negotiates
with a private sector firm to fulfill certain contracts, that firm must
include taxes with their expenses. This results in a higher cost but
in essence it means that the public sector is providing to the private
sector firm additional income that will be returned to the public sector
This information was received by telephone conversation with
Sikorsky Aircraft's Product Support Division. Their accounting
division was unwilling to disclose a comprehensive breakdown.
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in the form of taxes. In the case of organic support, this step does
not take place.
Because of the lack of data, only the corporation income tax,
both state and federal, will be analyzed. Referring to EXHIBIT #6,
Sikorsky's funded rates, it is shown that they added 15% for profit.
The State of Connecticut's corporation tax rate is 6. 5% and that of the
federal government is 48%. Any corporation state tax is deductible
from adjusted gross income, similar to an expense, for the sake of
determining federal income tax liability.
Throughout this analysis, marginal income is assumed, that
is, any income earned by Sikorsky through the overhaul of the CH-53
aircraft would be in addition to the firm's already existing income, and
as such will be additional profit and will be taxed at the full rate.
If $100,000 in marginal income is considered and the state
corporation rate of 6. 5% is applied, a state tax liability of $6500 results,
This leaves $93, 500 which is taxed at the federal rate of 48% or $44, 880,
The total tax liability on $100,000 marginal income is then found to be
$51,380. or a 51.3% total tax liability. For the sake of simplicity and
in conformance with the a fortiori approach, a total tax rate of 50% is
used in this analysis.
Without this 50% tax liability, Sikorsky Aircraft would realize
the same income if they added only a 7 1/2% figure for profit. Comput-
ing this out, 1. 075(1. 2. (3. 38X6. 38))) a new rate of $28. 05 is found for
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Sikorsky Aircraft. Instead of subtracting the difference between this
and the old rate of $30. 00 from Sikorsky's rate and again comparing
rates, it seems more logical to add this figure to the already adjusted
NARF, North Island, rate. This will in essence add a tax liability to
NARF's rate and make it more comparable with Sikorsky's.
Making this adjustment NARF's new rate is $34. 04 ($1. 95 +
32. 19) which compares even more unfavorably with Sikorsky's $30. 00.
Considering city and county taxes and property taxes would further
strengthen the argument in favor of the contractor in the category of
aircraft depot level maintenance and provides insight into future deci-
sions concerning contractor vs. organic support.
3. Effect of Capitalization of the Navy Industrial Fund
As of 3 1 August 1977, the cash allocation for the working
capital of the Navy Industrial Fund for the Naval Air Reworks Facility,
North Island was $13, 700. 00. [Ref. 12, EXHIBIT A-l], This amount
represents a permanent investment by the public sector in the overhaul
of aircraft, but for which there is nothing earned. In order to conduct
an equitable cost comparison, some opportunity cost should be included
for this amount. A defense contractor uses his own funds to conduct
operations and the cost of these funds is included in his per direct
labor hour charge. Therefore, the cost of maintaining the Navy
Industrial Fund at NARF should also be included in their rates. Depart-
ment of Defense Directive 7041.3 of 18 October 1972 and SECNAVINST
7000. 14B of 18 June 1975 states:
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Interest will be treated as a cost which is related to
all Government expenditures, regardless of whether
there are revenues or income by way of special taxes
for a project to be self-supporting. This policy is
based on the premise that no public investment should
be undertaken without explicitly considering the alter-
native uses of the funds which it absorbs or displaces.
a. One way for the Department of Defense to assume
this is to adopt a discount rate policy which reflects
private sector investment opportunities foregone.
The discount rate reflects the preference for current
and future money sacrifices that the public exhibits in
non-Government transactions. A 10 percent rate is
considered to be the most representative overall rate
at this time.
Again, using this 10 percent rate, an additional burden of
$1,370,000 is borne by the public sector annually. This charge has
no parallel when an analysis of contractor overhaul is considered.
Therefore, in order to have a more accurate comparison of contractor
versus organic support, some amount should be added to the NARF,
North Island rates.
This added amount can be found by multiplying the CH-53's
16 2/3% by the annual additional sum of $1, 370,000 and dividing by
average annual direct labor hours for CH-53 support ((16 2/3% X
1, 370, 000)/144900) which equals another $1.58 for a total adjusted
direct labor hour rate for NARF of $35. 62 ($32. 19 + $1. 95 + $1. 58).
D. CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
1 . Effects of Newly Computed Rates on Life Cycle Cost
Using these two figures (Sikorsky Aircraft = $30. 00 per direct
labor hour and Naval Air Rework Facility = $3 5. 62 per direct labor
39
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hour) and considering the expected twenty year life of the CH-53, and
additional life cycle cost of $8, 942, 918 (EXHIBIT #7) is borne by the
private sector when organic overhaul support is used instead of con-
tractor support in the CH-53 aircraft system.
This cost is expressed in terms of the present value of dif-
ference in the life cycle cost in 1976 dollars since 1976 data (funded
for FY77) was used in the analysis.
2. Other Factors With an Influencing Impact
In addition to this added expense to the public sector, other
factors enter into the decision to utilize either contractor or organic
support of aircraft systems. Most are difficult to quantify, in fact,
most are not yet known. Two additional factors are mentioned below
to provide areas for thought. The list is by no means complete.
a. Permanent Location
It has been previously mentioned that an anticipated move
of overhaul support for the CH-53 has given opportunity for a contractor
versus organic cost comparison. This move is going to be very costly
and would not be necessary under contractor support. Based on inter-
views with company executives, it is estimated that total cost to the
U.S. Navy for this move will approximate $2,000,000. This figure
includes the cost of Sikorsky's preparation of tooling and equipment
for the interim period and also the cost of shutting down the overhaul
operations at NARF, North Island, moving the equipment to NARF
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Pensacola and preparing that site for operation. And there is no
reason to believe that this will be the last move or the last unnecessary
tax burden on the private sector.
b. Aircraft Industry Business Fluctuations
A non-pecuniary benefit in contractor support would be a
reduction in the large fluctuations of the business cycle in the aircraft
industry. At Sikorsky Aircraft, these cycles have taken on ten year
intervals over history and have had a devastating effect on their employ-
ment situation. Peaks at Sikorsky have been with 12,000 employees
and valleys have been with 6, 000 employees. This means that during
every valley 6, 000 trained employees are laid off and presumably
pursue different careers. During each rise in the cycle, 6,000 new
employees are hired and require training. This is an added unquanti-
fiable expense and in addition, it requires time for these new employees
to reach the efficiency of the old departed workers. This training and
difference in efficiency represent costs which would not occur if con-
tractors were utilized for depot level maintenance. This would have
the effect of filling in the valleys, hence, reducing costs and increas-
ing proficiency, and at the same time, would have the added pecuniary
benefit of helping to stabilize local economies.
3. Summary
The advertised rate for direct labor hours presented by the
Naval Air Rework Center, North Island indicates that the Navy is
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utilizing the most economical source for aircraft overhaul in the CH-53
program. However, a direct comparison of these organic rates with
proposed contractor rates is insufficient and inaccurate because the
rates do not contain the same components.
As this chapter pointed out, the organic rates do not include
cost of land and facilities. It is interesting to note that when dealing
with non-federal government customers these costs are considered.
Excerpts from the Navy Industrial Fund Handbook for Naval Air
Rework Facilities reveal:
STATISTICAL COSTS---DEPRECIATION [Ref. 8, paragraph
4118. 2],
a. GENERAL. Depreciation will be computed on
buildings, structures and utilities, equipment and
industrial plant equipment which was used either
directly or indirectly in carrying out the productive
mission of the activity. Depreciation expense will
not be computed on items of plant property, the
maintenance of which is financed by military sup-
port or mobilization reserve funds.
UNFUNDED COST [Ref. 8, paragraph 4117. 8].
A. Definition . Unfunded (statistical) costs are defined as:
(1) Depreciation on Plant Property
(2) Military Pay and Allowances
b. Unfunded (Statistical) Rate. An unfunded
(statistical) rate will be established annually
for use in collecting unfunded costs applicable
to non-federal government orders
.
SCOPE (under Budgeting) [Ref. 8, paragraph 3102].
The Operating Budget will be based upon all data
available in connection with the anticipated
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workload. All operating costs will be financed
by the Navy Industrial Fund revealing fund ex-
cept the cost of Government furnished materials
and certain statistical costs. Although not funded
by NIF, Government Furnished material and
military pay and allowances will be included as
separate cost estimates in the production budget
and the cost center overhead budgets.
These statistical costs which are charged to non-federal
government employees contain not only an allowance for depreciation
but also an allowance for military pay and allowance. They are truly
a cost of doing business and should be included in any cost analysis
for future decisions.
Not included in statistical cost are the opportunities foregone
in the investment in land and in maintaining the Navy Industrial Fund.
In reaching any accurate conclusions concerning real cost, these items
must be considered. And, in any cost comparison between private and
public sectors, taxes should also be considered as documented above.
The present methods of cost analysis within the federal govern-
ment appear not to be peripheral, that is, they considered cost to only
certain funds not total cost to the government, whereas any contracted
cost with a defense contractor does represent total cost.
A Department of Defense directive adds an appropriate sum-
mation: [Ref. 14, paragraph IV, BJ.
.... the Department of Defense will depend upon
both private and Government commercial or
industrial sources for the provision of products
and services, with the objective of meeting its




Military Readiness Requirements, as a function of organic or
contractor support overhaul efficiency, would be the subject of another
study. However, contractor support cost as computed in this study is
clearly less than organic support, and even if equal effectiveness is




A. APPROACH OF STUDY
It should be emphasized that the primary purpose of this study was
not to change the existing CH-53 system but rather to provide informa-
tion for planning future systems. All calculations included in this study
are legitimate for future planning and the differences uncovered in cost-
ing between organic and contractor support should be considered in
evaluating true planned costs of training and overhaul support. This
study would have value to the CH-53 system only if that system were
in the planning stages, either initial or for further capital investment.
It is also worthy to again note that the issuance of OMB Circular
A-76 was subsequent to the introduction of the CH-53 to the operational
forces.
B. TRAINING AND OVERHAUL REVIEWED
1. Training
Two considerations are necessary in planning for the training
of maintenance personnel, efficiency and effectiveness. This study
compared annual cost of contractor versus organic training and found
7
contractor support to be favorable by $1, 662, 367 annually. This
In accordance with DOD Directive 7041.3, a 10% discount rate
was used to determine the annual cost to the private sector (oppor-
tunities foregone) of the initial capital investment.
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result favors contractor support when efficiency of the training pro-
gram is considered. The study also favors the contractor when effec-
tiveness (how well the training prepares the maintenance personnel to
perform their tasks) is considered but for more subjective reasons, for
example, years of instructor experience, instructor preparedness,
instructor continuity, and availability of current information to the
training program.
2. Overhaul
The results found in the overhaul comparison were contingent
upon the different costing methods used by the contractor versus organic
support. Three major areas of consideration were uncovered, the cost
of land and facilities, the effect of taxes, and the cost of maintaining
the Navy Industrial Fund. These are all costs that must be absorbed
by the contractor but are not reflected in any way in NARF North
Island's funded rates. When they were considered, another $13.46
per direct labor hour was found that should be added to NARF's rate
8
in order to make a more accurate comparison. It is felt that when
this latter figure of $13.46 is added to the funded rate of $22. 16, the
result of $35. 62 more accurately reflects the true cost per direct




C. COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
It has already been shown that a disparity exists in NARF's billing
system when Department of Defense customers are compared with
non-DOD ones [Ref. 8, paragraph 41 1 8. 2, 41 1 7. 8 and 3 102]. Another
disparity exists in the regulations by which the contractor must abide
but which do not apply to organic support. Specifically, Cost Account-
ing Standards Board Regulations, Part 414, under purpose, states:
£ 414. 20 Purpose.
The purpose of this Cost Accounting Standard is
to establish criteria for the measurement and al-
location of the cost of capital committed to facilities
as an element of contract cost. Consistent applica-
tion of these criteria will improve cost measurement
by providing for allocation of cost of contractor
investment in facilities capital to negotiated contracts.
The standard continues under "Fundamental requirement"
£ 414. 40 Fundamental requirement.
(a) A contractor's facilities capital shall be
measured and allocated in accordance with the
criteria set forth in this Standard. The allocated
amount shall be used as a base to which a cost of
money rate applied
(b) The cost of money rate shall be based on
interest rates determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury, pursuant to Pub. L. 92-41 (85 Stat. 97).
(c) The cost of capital committed to facilities
shall be separately computed for each contract
using facilities capital cost of money factors com-
puted for each cost accounting period.
It is clear that the federal government considers the cost of capital
and facilities in evaluating contract rates proposed by defense contractors
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Therefore, it is felt that it is quite equitable to consider the same costs
when arriving at a final hourly cost per direct labor hour for organic
support.
D. CONCLUSION
This study has shown that contractor support is a viable alternative
in some areas of aircraft system maintenance. Not only can costs be
reduced in certain areas but contractor training may pay dividends by
increasing the effectiveness of the individual maintenance personnel.
This could result in a decreased number of aircraft and spare parts
necessary to support a squadron's mission, thereby further reducing
costs to the public sector.
In all future aircraft systems, a complete cost analysis should be
performed in order to identify those areas where contractor support
is feasible. In one present aircraft system, (T-44) all support is
supplied by the contractor, the only task which is performed by the
U.S. Navy is the piloting of the aircraft.
Another benefit which can be derived from utilizing more contractor
support, especially in the area of aircraft overhaul, is a reduction in
the amount of aircraft industry extra capacity. According to a Joint
DOD/OMB study, the best estimate of annual total costs to DOD of
the current level of extra capacity in the aircraft industry is $300-500
million. [Ref. 16, page 7], Extra capacity is defined as the difference
between what the industry has demonstrated recently it can produce
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and what it is now producing. It is felt that the annual cost of this
extra capacity could be reduced by awarding to the industry, contracts
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